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ARTICLE
CONSISTENCY WITH COMPREHENSIVE PLANS:
DOES MARYLAND LAW MEAN WHAT IT SAYS, OR SAY
WHAT IT MEANS?
Royce Hanson
In 2008 the Maryland Court of Appeals in David Train v. Terrapin Run
LLC1 upheld the grant of a special exception for a planned development of
4300 homes, a 125,000 square foot shopping center, and a sewage treatment
plant in an area the Allegany County comprehensive plan designated for
agriculture and conservation. At issue was whether the Board of Appeals
could approve the project in light of the Maryland Code’s definition of a
“special exception” as:
A grant of a specific use that would not be appropriate
generally or without restriction and shall be based upon a
finding that certain conditions governing special
exceptions as detailed in the zoning ordinance exist, that
the use conforms to the plan and is compatible with the
existing neighborhood.2
A closely divided court held that the statute did not require strict
conformity with the comprehensive plan for two reasons. First, the plan was
a guide for future development of the county, but it had no regulatory effect
unless a statute, ordinance, or regulation required compliance with its
recommendations. Second, the use of the term “conforms to the plan,”
which first appeared in amendments to Article 66B in 19703 and was
retained in 1992,4 had essentially the same meaning as the usage prior to
that date, which required that special exceptions should be “in harmony”
with the plan. The court went to considerable length in supporting its
position that various “Smart Growth” statutes had not mandated that
counties have comprehensive plans, or if they did, the state had no power to
enforce a conformity clause.

1.
2.
3.
4.

Trail v. Terrapin Run, LLC, 403 Md. 523 (2008).
Maryland Code (1957, 2003 Repl. Vol.), Article 66, § 1(k),
1970 Md. Laws Ch. 672.
1992 Md. Laws Ch. 437.
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Accordingly, we find nothing in the history of the 1992 legislation
that remotely indicates that the Legislature believed that it was
establishing that the use of the word ‘conform’ in the 1970 statute
and as stated in Article 66B, without additional restrictive language
which was not added, imposed any stricter standard on such land
use decisions than the traditional ‘in harmony with’ language of the
pre-1970 statute or our pre-and post-1970 cases meant the same
thing. 5
Judge Harrell, dissenting, argued that provisions of Article 66B requiring
a finding of conformance with the comprehensive plan were not mere
suggestions. Rather, the definition of special exception linked it to the
comprehensive plan. He further argued that the pre-1970 “in harmony”
standard applied not to the comprehensive land use plan, but to the zoning
plan, an element of the comprehensive plan.
In direct response to the Terrapin Run decision, the 2009 session of the
General Assembly enacted the Smart Growth and Sustainable Development
Act (SGSDA).6 The preamble to the legislation noted that while the court’s
holding could be construed to apply only to special exceptions, the General
Assembly was concerned that a broader interpretation could undermine the
importance of making land use decisions “that are consistent with the
comprehensive plan,” as required by Article 66B, § 4.09. It then expressed
the intent of the General Assembly:
To encourage the development of ordinances and
regulations that apply to locally designated priority
funding areas and allow for mixed uses and bonus
densities beyond those specified in the local
comprehensive plan by excluding land uses and densities
or intensities in the definition of ‘consistency’ for priority
funding areas; and
… as evidenced in Article 66B, §§ 1.03(e) and 4.09, that
comprehensive plans should be followed as closely as
possible while not being elevated to the status of an
ordinance and that deviations from the plan should be
rare.7

5. See Trail, 403 Md. at 569-70.
6. 2009 Md. Laws Ch. 180.
7. S.B. 280, 1999 Leg. (Md. 2009) (see Preamble at 3).
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Standing alone, this artful circumlocution in the preamble of the law
appeared to have it both ways. It encouraged higher densities and mixed
uses in priority funding areas beyond levels specified in plans. The second
Whereas clause, however, insisted projects follow plans “as closely as
possible,” before softening the blow by not elevating the plan to regulatory
status. Apart from the atmospherics surrounding adoption of the law that
characterized it as a repudiation of the court’s decision, it would seem the
General Assembly wanted to leave things about where they were before the
issue went to court, making a confirming wink at the court’s droll aside in
Terrapin Run : “We acknowledge that purpose clauses are not normally
absolute indications of the Legislature’s intent when passing a statute.”8
To understand what the legislature intended to do, we must look first at
what it actually did and rely on the plain language of the statute, at least
insofar as the language is unambiguous. This is not as simple as it sounds,
so we shall proceed step by step.
First, the General Assembly amended the definition of “special
exception” to require a finding that the use “is consistent with” the plan.9 It
then defined consistency with a comprehensive plan to mean:
. . . an action taken that will further, and not be contrary to, the
following items in the plan:
1.policies;
2.timing of the implementation of the plan;
3.timing of development
4.timing of rezoning;
5.development patterns;
6.land uses; and
7.densities or intensities.10
In addition to the redefined special exceptions, covered actions include
zoning, planned development, subdivision and other ordinances and
regulations.11 Water and sewerage service areas, solid waste disposal, and
municipal annexations required findings of plan consistency.12 That seems
to be just about everything, and if the amendment stopped there, a plain
8.
9.
10.
11.

403 Md. at 570 n.41.
2009 Md. Laws Ch. 180 § 1.00(k)
Ch. 180 § 1.02(c); MD. CODE ANN., LAND USE § 1-303 (2017).
Ch. 180 § 1.02(a)(1); cf §§ 1.00(k), 1.04 (f), and 4.09; MD. CODE ANN., LAND
USE § 1-301 (2017).
12. Ch. 180 §§ 1.02 (a)(2), (3) and 1.02 (b); MD. CODE ANN., LAND USE § 1-302
(2017).
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reading of it would make it clear that projects such as Terrapin Run could
not pass muster as furthering and not being contrary to the comprehensive
plan.
But the General Assembly was not through. It made an exception that
swallowed a substantial length of the rule. Actions taken in priority funding
areas (PFAs)--designated in plans for higher densities and given priority in
state capital funding programs—are not required to be consistent with plans
with regard to land uses and densities or intensities.13 Then, in 2012, the
General Assembly enacted a clarifying amendment to the consistency rule,
requiring charter counties to revise comprehensive plans on a 10-year cycle
and that they:
shall ensure the implementation of the visions, the development
regulations element, and the sensitive areas element of the plan.
. . . through adoption of the following applicable implementation
mechanisms that are consistent with the comprehensive plan:
1.zoning laws; and
2.local laws governing:
i.planned development;
ii.subdivision; and
iii.other land use provisions.14
Special Exceptions Must be Consistent
Reading the clarified law in its entirety, the legislature, at a minimum,
changed the law prospectively to render illegal approval of a special
exception in a non-priority funding area that does not further and is contrary
to the seven specified elements of a comprehensive plan, or the first five
elements if in a priority funding area. It did not directly or immediately
affect the status of Terrapin Run. The state Department of the Environment
(MDE), however, denied changes in water and sewerage categories
necessary for Terrapin Run to proceed.15 The State Department of Planning,
joining with MDE, rejected the county’s designation of the area as Tier II
13. Ch. 180 § 1.02(c); MD. CODE ANN., LAND USE. § 1-304 (2017).
14. MD. CODE ANN., LAND USE § 1-417 (2012), amended by 2013 Md. Laws Ch.
674.
15. There is independent authority to deny changes in sewer service areas that are
inconsistent with a county’s comprehensive plan. MD. CODE ANN., LAND USE §
9-501 et seq; § 9-506 (a)(1) (2017). For example, In The Matter of Global
Mission Church of Greater Washington SBC, Case. No. 10-C-08-003362, Cir. Ct.
Frederick County, Md. found the Frederick County Planning Commission acted
within its authority in denying the church’s application for a change in water and
sewer service category upon finding it was not consistent with the county’s
comprehensive plan.
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for future water and sewer service, arguing that it should be placed in Tier
IV for no service and restricting development to minor subdivisions of
seven or fewer lots served by well and septic. Following further litigation,
mediation, threat of and rescue from foreclosure, the project appeared dead
in 2013. The law would make future Terrapin Runs illegal.
The Pooh Rule
In commenting on the probability of bees noticing one conducting a
balloon-assisted raid on their honey, Winnie the Pooh advised Christopher
Robin: “They might or they might not. . . . You never can tell with bees.”16
So it seems with the consistency doctrine in dealing with subdivisions and
zoning. It is safe to say SGSDA replaced the “in harmony with” standard
with the tighter definition of consistency. Thus, endeth the lesson in
legislative clarity.
The Maryland Department of Planning (MDP) has been circumspect in
its exposition of the law. Its publication designed to prepare planning
commissioners and members of boards of appeals for the statutorily
mandatory course on their respective duties says that SGSDA clarifies
“consistency” between comprehensive plans and local zoning ordinances
and regulations. It then states that:
In order to implement the 12 planning visions, the 1992 Economic
Growth, Resource Protection, and Planning Act required all
jurisdictions to adopt ordinances and regulations (this includes
rezoning ordinances), planned development ordinances and
regulations, subdivision ordinances and regulations, and other land
use ordinances and regulations that are ‘consistent’ with the plan.17
By adding the parenthetical reference to rezoning ordinances, MDP
casually recognized that rezoning cases, unlike subdivisions and special
exceptions, are the places where actions are most likely not to further the
local comprehensive plan, or to be contrary to one or more of the seven
items with which the law requires consistency. This is because Maryland
courts have long held master plans have regulatory authority when local law
requires subdivisions to be consistent with them. This linkage has enabled

16. See A.A. MILNE, WINNIE THE POOH (Methuen & Co. Ltd. pub.) (1st ed. 1926).
17. Planning Commission, Planning Board, and Board of Appeals Education Course,
Module Two: The Comprehensive Plan, MD. PLANNING COMM’RS ASSOC. 2 – 1, 2
–
7
https://planning.maryland.gov/PDF/YourPart/
PlanningCommissionerTraining/Planning101_TheComprehensivePlan.pdf (last
visited May 18, 2017).
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regulators to impose conditions on subdivisions that reduce substantially the
yield of space and units permitted by the property’s zoning.18 Zoning map
amendments have a more complex relationship to comprehensive plans.
Most zones are not linked to plans and can be applied without regard to
plan recommendations so long as they meet other legal requirements. There
are two basic forms of zoning actions. Individual zoning map amendments
involve single parcels and usually are initiated by application of the
property owner or contract purchaser. Comprehensive (or sectional) map
amendments involve substantially more than a single parcel—even an entire
county—and are initiated by the government.19
Individual Map Amendments
Individual map amendments are quasi-judicial in character and require a
particularized finding of facts by the decision maker.20 A change in
Euclidean zones, which usually contain fixed dimensional standards,
requires a finding of change in the character of the neighborhood where the
new zone is to be applied since the last comprehensive rezoning, or that
there was a mistake in the original zoning of the property.21 A floating zone,
which has been characterized as “in the nature of a special exception,” does
not have to meet the Change-Mistake Rule and may be applied upon
finding it meets the particular standards of its purpose clause. Prior to the
SGSGA, local map amendments, whether they involved Euclidean or
floating zones were not required to be consistent with the comprehensive
plan unless the text of the applicable zone required it.22
Unless otherwise conferred by statute or ordinance, standing to appeal an
18. The Court of Appeals in Trail restated the rule from Mayor and Council of
Rockville v. Rylyns Enterprises, Inc., 372 Md. 514, 530 (2002) (internal citations
omitted). “We repeatedly have noted that plans, which are the result of work done
by planning commissions and adopted by ultimate zoning bodies, are advisory in
nature and have no force of law absent statutes or local ordinances linking
planning and zoning. Where the latter exist, however, they serve to elevate the
status of comprehensive plans to the level of true regulatory device…” 403 Md. at
527 n.5.
19. To avoid confusion between comprehensive plans and comprehensive zoning
map amendments, I shall, in most cases, refer to the latter as sectional map
amendments.
20. Hyson v. Montgomery County Council, 242 Md. 55 (1966).
21. The rule is based on the assumption that the comprehensive rezoning was a wellconceived plan that took into account broad public interests, as contrasted with
the particular interests of a single landowner. Thus, there is a strong presumption
of the correctness of the original or comprehensive rezoning. See Barlow Burke,
Jr., The Change-Mistake Rule and Zoning in Maryland, 25 AM. U. L. REV. 631,
633 n.9 (1975) (noting the leading and related cases on the rule, the history of the
rule, and unjust criticism of the rule).
22. Rylyns Enterprises, Inc., 372 Md. at 530 (2002); See Trail, 403 Md. 523.
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individual zoning map amendment decision is based on the proximity of the
plaintiff’s property to the rezoned parcel. Property owners with land
immediately adjoining or confronting the rezoned parcel have prime facie
aggrievement. Other nearby owners whose property does not touch or
confront the parcel may have “almost prime facie aggrievement” if they are
not too far distant (e.g., 200-1000 feet) and allege “plus factors” of injury,
such as noise, congestion, reduction in property value, etc. attributable to
development that would occur under the change in zoning.23
The standard of review for a local map amendment is limited to
determining if the decision was based on an erroneous interpretation of law
and “whether the issue before the administrative body is ‘fairly debatable,’
that is, whether its determination is based upon evidence from which
reasonable persons could come to different conclusions.”24 To be fairly
debatable, a decision must be made in a quasi-judicial fact-finding process
that includes opportunity for cross-examination and is supported by
“substantial evidence” in the record as a whole.25 The only part of the
individual map amendment process that is legislative is the final action of
the local governing body that approves the amendment to its zoning map.
Comprehensive/Sectional Zoning Map Amendments.
Sectional map amendments are purely legislative acts. They are
presumed valid, and absent specific statutory authority, judicial review is
limited in scope to “assessing whether the agency was acting within its
legal boundaries.”26 Prior to the SGSDA there was no requirement, absent a
statute or ordinance, that a sectional zoning map amendment must be
consistent with a comprehensive plan’s zoning recommendations.27 That
statute now exists and provides the basis for a cause of action by an eligible
complainant that alleges the action of the legislative body was illegal or
23. Anne Arundel County v. Bell, 442 Md. 539 (2015); Ray v. Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore, 430 Md. 74, 85 (2013); Bryniarski v. Montgomery County
Board of Appeals, 247 Md. 137, 144 (1967).
24. Sembly v. County Bd. of Appeals of Baltimore County, 269 Md. 177, 182
(1973); see also Montgomery County v. Butler, 41 Md. 271, 283 (2010);
Marzullo v. Kahl, 366 Md. 158, 171 (2001).
25. White v. North, 356 Md. 31, 44 (1999).
26. County Council of Prince George’s County v. Offen, 334 Md. 499 (1994);
Norbeck Village Joint Venture v. Montgomery County Council, 254 Md. 59, 67
(1969). See also Howard County v. Dorsey, 292 Md. 351, 362-63 (1982);
Montgomery County v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 280 Md. 686, 706-07 (1977),
cert. denied sub nom. Funger v. Montgomery County, 434 U.S. 1067 (1978);
County Council v. District Land Corp., 274 Md. 691, 701-02 (1975);
Montgomery County v. Leizman, 268 Md. 621, 631-33 (1973); Ark Readi-Mix
Concrete Corp. v. Smith, 251 Md. 1, 4 (1968).
27. See Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 280 Md. 686.

126 University of Baltimore Journal of Land and Development Vol. 6
ultra vires; outside its legal boundaries because it does not further or is
contrary to—i.e., is not consistent with—one or more of the enumerated
plan elements in the SGSDA. But standing to bring suit to challenge
inclusion in a comprehensive zoning amendment of parcels zoned
inconsistently with the comprehensive plan may be harder to achieve under
new rules enunciated by the Court of Appeals in April 2015.
Taxpayers Left Standing: Bell and Harwood
In paired cases arising from Anne Arundel County, the Court of Appeals
distinguished the basis for standing in sectional map amendment cases from
individual zoning cases. Following adoption of a new General Development
Plan,28 Anne Arundel County in 2011 enacted a sectional map amendment
covering 59,045 properties in the area of Thurgood Marshall Airport and
the Baltimore-Washington Parkway. Zoning was changed on 264 parcels
and the prior zoning was reconfirmed for the remaining parcels. Several
individuals and civic organizations filed suit for declaratory judgment,
alleging the county had engaged in spot and contract zoning by
reclassifying certain parcels inconsistently with the plan. The county and
intervening property owners moved to dismiss the citizens’ suit for lack of
standing. The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding the
citizens failed to prove special aggrievement and that Maryland law did not
support standing based on prime facie aggrievement for landowners by
virtue of their proximity to the contested parcels.
In Bell v. Anne Arundel County29 the Court of Special Appeals reversed,
holding that adjoining, confronting, and nearby property owners
challenging a local government land use decision had standing as prima
facie aggrieved and other owners whose property was farther away were
almost prima facie aggrieved by alleging other “plus factors” supporting
injury.30 The effect of the Court of Special Appeals decision was to
recognize no distinction between standing requirements for challengers of
legislative acts such as sectional map amendments and those appealing
quasi-judicial administrative decisions on individual zoning amendments.
While review of Bell was pending before the Court of Appeals, a
separate challenge to another Anne Arundel County sectional map
amendment in the southern sector of the county came before the Court of

28. Anne Arundel County General Development Plan, ANNE ARUNDEL CO. COUNCIL
1,
3
(Apr.
2009)
http://www.aacounty.org/departments/planning-andzoning/forms-and-publications/GDP2009.pdf.
29. Bell v. Anne Arundel County, 215 Md. App. 161 (2013); cert. granted, Md. No.
29 (March 21, 2014); rev’d sub nom Anne Arundel County v. Bell, 442 Md. 539
(2015) (hereinafter “Anne Arundel v. Bell”).
30. Bell, 215 Md. App. at 183 (citing Ray, 430 Md. at 85).
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Special Appeals. In Harwood Civic Association v. Anne Arundel County,31
landowners and civic associations challenged the rezoning of eight farm
properties, of some 50 included in the amendment, as a violation of the
consistency rule and as illegal spot zoning. Anne Arundel County Circuit
Court again dismissed the case for lack of standing for all but two plaintiffs.
Invoking its Bell decision, the Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding
the plaintiffs had standing.
The Court of Appeals reversed the intermediate court in both Bell and
Harwood, holding that plaintiffs challenging a sectional map amendment
must demonstrate taxpayer standing.32 The Court concluded that proximity
to rezoned property and near-proximity with “plus” factors, which
conferred standing in local map amendment cases were inappropriate bases
for contesting the purely legislative action involved in comprehensive
rezoning.
The principles underlying property owner standing, heretofore
applied to judicial review actions and other modalities of judicial
challenges to quasi-judicial and other administrative land use
decisions, should not be extended to apply to challenges to
comprehensive zoning legislative actions. Comprehensive zoning
on the one hand, and quasi-judicial or administrative land use
actions on the other, are not similar sufficiently in process or
justification to warrant extension by analogy of property owner
standing principles from the latter to the former. Rather, taxpayer
standing
is
the
correct
standing
doctrine
which
Respondents/Plaintiffs must satisfy before they may be allowed to
maintain a judicial challenge to comprehensive zoning legislation.33
The court pointed out that an individual rezoning action is decided on
“individual, as opposed to general, grounds, and scrutinizes a single
property”34 and (except for floating zones) must clear the threshold of the
Change-Mistake Rule.35 Such actions are taken under procedural rules
governing executive and administrative decision making that require at least
one hearing and opportunity for cross-examination. The decision involves a
factual determination by the zoning authority that is supported by
substantial evidence of record. The action is legislative only at the end
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Anne Arundel County v. Harwood Civic Association, 442 Md. 595 (2015).
Anne Arundel v. Bell, 442 Md. at 586.
Id. at 551 n.5.
Id at 555 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Id.
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because the legislative body must enact a resolution or ordinance amending
the zoning map. Rooted in the common law of private nuisance, standing to
challenge such actions depends on proximity of challengers to the property
at issue. Adjacent and confronting owners are considered to be prime facie
aggrieved, and thus have standing to seek relief from the courts. Other
nearby owners (the court found no case allowing standing to complainants
with property more than 1000 feet from the rezoned parcel) may be
considered “almost prime facie” aggrieved if they offer additional “plus
factors” asserting injury.36
Summarizing Montgomery County v. Woodward & Lothrop37 and Mayor
and Council of Rockville v. Rylyns Enterprises,38 the Court emphasized that
comprehensive rezoning differs from individual zoning cases in process,
geographic scope, and the standard of review. The process is
legislative in its entirety. No significant judicial function is
involved. It is initiated by the legislative body and usually involves
an area containing a considerable number of properties. Rather than
making a particularized determination regarding a single property,
the legislative body considers broad policy issues of future public
needs and the relationship of the matter to the public health, safety,
and general welfare. Comprehensive zonings ‘are limited only by
the general boundaries of …appropriate procedural and due process
considerations.’39
The standard of review is whether the legislature had any reasonable basis
for its action.
In a detailed exegesis of the Superblock Trilogy40 and State Center41, the
Court distinguished administrative and executive land use decisions that
focus on the particular facts of a single parcel and legislative actions that
consider general issues of public policy. Standing based on proximity of
property ownership applied to the former, but had not been applied to
“judicial challenges to legislative acts reached through solely legislative
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 559.
Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 280 Md. 686.
Rylyns Enterprises, Inc., 372 Md. 514.
Id. at 533.
120 W. Fayette St., LLLP v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 407 Md. 253
(2009) (hereinafter “Superblock I”); 120 West Fayette St., LLLP v. Mayor and
City Council of Baltimore, 413 Md. 309 (2010) (hereinafter “Superblock II”);
120 West Fayette St., LLLP v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 426 Md. 14
(2011) (hereinafter “Superblock III”).
41. State Center, LLC v. Lexington Charles Limited Partnership, 438 Md. 451
(2014).
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processes.”42 Pointing out that the Anne Arundel sectional map amendment
challenged in Bell involved 59,045 parcels, the Court mused that granting
standing on the basis of property ownership might make eligible plaintiffs
of owners of all those parcels as well as other owners of property adjoining,
confronting, or within 200 to 1000 feet of the perimeter of the rezoned
area.43 Hypothesizing an exponential increase in suits brought by property
owners suffering no greater harm than that experienced by the general
public, the Court concluded:
The doctrine of taxpayer standing—already available to some
complainants challenging administrative land use decisions—
is the appropriate standing doctrine that complainants challenging
comprehensive zoning legislation must satisfy.44
To attain taxpayer standing, a complainant must allege (1) it is a
taxpayer, (2) the suit is brought on behalf of all other taxpayers in a class
suffering the same injury, (3) the governmental action is illegal or ultra
vires, and (4) the action specially injures the taxpayer by resulting in a
pecuniary loss or an increase in taxes. (5) Finally, there must be a “nexus”
between the government’s action, the potential pecuniary loss, and the
potential for the remedy to alleviate the harm to the plaintiff and all
similarly situated taxpayers.45
The Court was sanguine about the ability of taxpayers, whether they
owned directly affected property or not, to attain standing to challenge
comprehensive zoning amendments. The litigants in both Bell and
Harwood, however, were denied standing. The Court assumed at least two
Bell plaintiffs were taxpayers. They alleged the county engaged in illegal
spot zoning of certain properties included in the comprehensive zoning
action, satisfying one prong of the standing test. They failed, however, to
allege a pecuniary loss or increase in their taxes as a consequence of the
action.46 Harwood’s plaintiffs also relied exclusively on property owner
standing. Although the Court thought one plaintiff may have met two of the
requirements for taxpayer standing by alleging the decision would increase
her taxes and that the rezoning of particular properties was impermissible
spot zoning, she had waived claiming taxpayer standing.47

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Anne Arundel v. Bell, 442 Md. at 569.
Id. at 570.
Id. at 575.
Id. at 577-79.
Id. at 584-86.
Harwood, 442 Md. at 613-15.
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The Court majority bushed aside the dissenters’ concern that taxpayer
standing could severely circumscribe the ability of aggrieved property
owners to challenge a comprehensive zoning action, citing a number of
cases in which it had been successfully maintained to challenge both
executive and legislative actions.48 Theoretically, if it satisfied all prongs of
the test, any taxpayer can bring suit under taxpayer doctrine since proximity
to a questioned parcel is unnecessary. There will likely one or more
taxpayers with property covered by the comprehensive zoning amendment
and even more located outside it that will experience the same effects from
the action. But taxpayer standing presumes tax effects, such as a tax
increase or at least a pecuniary loss, as a consequence of the zoning action.
If a complainant’s property value has been diminished by a sectional map
amendment, that should satisfy the requirement of special harm, even
though taxes would, thereby, also be reduced. The requirement is pecuniary
injury OR a tax increase.49 This harm must be shared with other taxpayers
and the relief sought must alleviate the injury or tax burden.50
Parties whose properties are rezoned to lower densities or less desirable
uses than were previously permitted are frequent challengers of
comprehensive zoning amendments. It seems unlikely taxpayer standing
doctrine will affect the ability of such complainants to achieve standing.
The Court casually observed that in Anderson House v. Mayor and City
Council of Rockville51 the plaintiff was entitled to review of the claim that
its rights were affected by the change in zoning imposed by a sectional map
amendment. Anderson House did not plead as a taxpayer but as an owner
objecting to the zone applied to its property. The Court of Appeals held the
circuit court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal by virtue of a city ordinance
enacted pursuant to state law52 or under the Declaratory Judgment Act.53
The allegation that the zone applied to its property failed to meet the
48. Taxpayer standing to challenge executive actions: State Center, 438 Md. at 583;
Superblock I, 407 Md. at 269-70; Inlet Associates v. Assateague House
Condominium Assoc., 313 Md. 413, 440-43 (1988). Taxpayer standing to
challenge legislative actions: Ansell v. Howard County Council, 264 Md. 629,
634 (1972); Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Keyser, 72 Md. 106 (1890);
Boitnott v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 356 Md. 226 (1999).
49. 438 Md. at 556–57, 92 A.3d at 463 (quoting Citizens Planning and Housing
Association v. County Executive of Baltimore County, 273 Md. 333, 339 (1974)).
The dissenting opinion in Bell surmised taxpayer standing could not be achieved
if taxes do not increase. That seems an overreaction to the majority opinion.
However, if the potential plaintiff’s property has its value increased by the zoning
action, the resulting increase in taxes incident to an increase in property value has
not been considered an actionable injury.
50. State Center, 438 Md. at 572-73 (footnote omitted).
51. Bellamy v. State, 400 Md. 646 (2007).
52. MD. CODE ANN., LAND USE § 4-406 (2017).
53. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & J. PROC. §§ 3-403, 3-406, and 3-409 (2017).
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requirement that zones treat uniformly all property to which they are
applied satisfied the jurisdictional requirements of the Declaratory
Judgment Act. Pecuniary loss or a resulting increase in taxation of the
plaintiff and similarly situated taxpayers, were not at issue.
Ultimately, the requirement of taxpayer standing may not bar the
courthouse door to parties offended by the zones bestowed by sectional map
amendments. Maryland jurisdictions either grant the right of judicial review
by circuit court of individual and comprehensive zoning actions to
aggrieved parties, or even any parties participating in the zoning process.54
Could Anderson House have qualified for taxpayer standing? It clearly
was not acting as a private attorney general to vindicate the public interest
against an illegal act of the government. But with modest creativity in the
bill of complaint, Anderson House might have metamorphosed into a
taxpayer with standing had it not gained it by way of the city code. It made
a good faith allegation that the rezoning of its property was an ultra vires
act. It was a taxpayer. No allegation was made that taxes would be
increased, but it could make a palpable claim of pecuniary loss due to the
down zoning, which prevented development of a larger office building.55
The rub comes in showing explicitly or implicitly that the harm it suffered
was shared by a similarly situated class of taxpayers. “In other words, the
allegations of the injury must apply to all taxpayers in the assumed class
and not merely the plaintiffs as private complainants, in order for the
taxpayer standing doctrine to apply.”56
Because Anderson House was the only property owner so affected, a
liberal application of the rule would be required to conjure a class. That was
conceivably available since it claimed the zone applied to it and other
54. MD. CODE ANN., LAND USE § 4-401 covers all jurisdictions outside Baltimore
City and the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission. It allows
any person aggrieved by the action, taxpayers, and local officials to file for
judicial review of a zoning action of a board of appeals or legislative body.
Similar provisions for Baltimore City are provided in Section 10-501. In MNCPPC jurisdictions, Section 22-402 allows any aggrieved person or any person
that appeared at the hearing, in person, by attorney, or in writing in Montgomery
County, to request judicial review of an individual or sectional map amendment.
Section 22-407, governing Prince George’s County, allows appeals by any
municipality, taxing district, person, civic or homeowners association, or
aggrieved applicant to seek judicial review of an individual or sectional map
amendment.
55. “[A] party, as a taxpayer, may satisfy the ‘special damage’ standing requirement
by alleging both ‘1) an action by a municipal corporation or public official that is
illegal or ultra vires, and 2) that the action may injuriously affect the taxpayer’s
property, meaning that it reasonably may result in a pecuniary loss to the taxpayer
or an increase in taxes.’” Kendall v. Howard County, 431 Md. 590, 605 (2013)
(quoting Superblock I, 407 Md. at 267).
56. State Center, 438 Md. at 554-55.
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properties did not treat them uniformly, even though the other owners may
not have suffered pecuniary loss or a tax increase. A more creative
argument might allege that the suit was in behalf of all taxpayers, since the
down zoning would result in a possible loss to the city treasury, which
could result in a general tax increase. There was a clear nexus between the
alleged injury and the zoning action and a declaratory judgment could
remedy the alleged wrong. Dicta in Bell suggests courts should erect a high
threshold of solemnity when applying the laugh test to assertions of
taxpayer standing. It is doubtful, however, that Anderson House could have
lost its case on the merits more gracefully had it achieved standing as a
taxpayer instead of as a disgruntled property owner.
Retrofitting Anderson House suggests that in comprehensive zoning
cases that adversely affect a single party, it may be difficult to meet all
prongs of the taxpayer standing rule. But it is hard to imagine an affected
owner would be denied standing to vindicate its private property interest
against alleged unlawful government action. In such instances it may be
necessary to sue for damages under regulatory taking doctrine instead of
seeking a declaratory judgment or injunction. That route, however, is not a
particularly promising option if the comprehensive zoning has left the
property with reasonable uses and has not singled it out for arbitrary
action.57 Historically, suits by disappointed owners challenging
classification of their property in lower densities or more limited uses as
part of comprehensive zoning amendments, or claims of denial of due
process, have not fared well in Maryland courts.58
Taxpayer standing is an awkward fit for an owner of down zoned
property with a minimal deep interest in serving as private attorney general.
It presents greater challenges for citizens performing that role with more
enthusiasm, particularly if they have no directly impacted property or
increased tax liability. Bell and Harwood suggest that citizen/taxpayer suits
to enforce the consistency rule are likely to increase, particularly in
situations where a sectional map amendment is used as a Christmas tree for
selectively favored owners whose applications could not survive the
individual rezoning process.
The Court of Appeals offered Boitnott v. Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore59 as an example of how well taxpayer standing can work. Several
57. “For an individual property owner to escape the binding impact of a
comprehensive rezoning he must show that the plan lacks the necessary
relationship to the general public interest and welfare that is presumed or that the
effect of the plan is to deprive him of any reasonable use of his property.”
Norbeck Village Joint Venture v. Montgomery County Council, 254 Md. 59, 67
(1969).
58. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
59. See White, 356 Md. 226.
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taxpayers filed for declaratory judgment and an interlocutory injunction to
invalidate an urban renewal ordinance. The Court found they achieved
taxpayer standing, although few, if any of them lived in the renewal area,
because they alleged the city’s action was illegal and ultra vires, and that
they and other taxpayers would be damaged by increased taxes to pay for
the redevelopment of the area.
In contrast with the situation in Boitnott, the Harwood and Bell plaintiffs
had harder cases to make. Some alleged their property values would fall,
thus incurring a pecuniary loss. If there were more than one, they had an
ostensible class. The overall thrust of the comprehensive zoning, however,
was to increase densities and, thus, revenue yields. As a consequence, other
taxpayers could see a reduction in taxes; or if taxes rose, it would be a result
of increased property values, which is generally not considered an injury to
the taxpayer. If there was any tax effect, it was unlikely to be different than
that enjoyed by the general public.
Plaintiffs like those in Boitnott that do not own property directly affected
by the rezoning must be creative in alleging the special aggrievement
necessary for taxpayer standing. The basic difference between citizen
complainants and owners of down zoned property is that the former are
suing to vindicate the public interest in enforcing the consistency rule while
the latter are likely suing for relief from its application to their property. It
would be ironic indeed if it became more difficult for proponents of
consistency to achieve standing than its opponents.
Assuming complainants achieve standing as taxpayers or by statutes
granting right of appeal to circuit court, the consistency doctrine is likely to
have different effects in cases involving individual and comprehensive
zoning amendments, and in priority funding areas (PFAs) and the areas
outside them.
Potential Effects of the Consistency Rule in Priority Funding Areas
Individual Map Amendments
The logic of Smart Growth is to concentrate growth in each county’s
priority funding areas (PFAs)--relatively compact, moderate-to-high density
areas with supporting infrastructure. That objective can be facilitated by
adopting current, well-designed comprehensive plans that identify strategic
locations for changes in land use and major increases in density and
implementing them with consistent zoning and timely capital
improvements.
The SGSDA, as noted above, provides for exemptions from consistency
for land uses, densities and intensities—the most definitive features of a
zoning class. The preamble of the SGSDA explains the purpose of the
exemptions is to permit bonus densities and mixed uses in priority funding
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areas.60 The exemptions, however, may perversely create obstacles rather
than facilitate well-planned and orderly development and redevelopment,
especially if a jurisdiction adopts a comprehensive plan but does not follow
up with a sectional map amendment.
In the absence of a consistent sectional map amendment the initiative lies
with developers to apply for rezoning of individual prime parcels for more
dense or different land uses. Assuming no conflict with the plan’s
recommendations for the timing or pattern of development, the principal
constraint on approving an individual rezoning application, whether or not
it is consistent with the plan, is the requirement to establish change in the
character of the neighborhood since the last comprehensive zoning, or if a
floating zone, that its purposes are met. If these hurdles are cleared, zones
can be approved that may not advance, or may even be contrary to, the
recommendations of the plan, which remains merely a guide, as it was
when Terrapin Run was decided.
A different problem could result if a consistent sectional map amendment
is adopted that basically ratifies existing conditions. By setting a new
zoning baseline it would be almost impossible to approve an individual
zoning application that increased density or introduced different uses
because a change in the character of the neighborhood could not be shown.
This would maintain consistency with the plan’s lack of interest in
achieving much but frustrate the SGSDA’s ostensible objective of
encouraging higher densities and mixed uses in PFAs.
In a final scenario, if an ambitious comprehensive plan recommends new
higher density centers of growth but, again, is not followed with a
consistent sectional map amendment, it cannot be implemented through
individual map amendments using Euclidean zones if no change occurred in
the character of the neighborhood since the last comprehensive zoning. On
the other hand, if change is established, an individual rezoning could be
approved whether it is consistent or not with the plan.
Floating zones can evade the change-mistake problem, and given the
ingenuity of the land use bar, such zones or text amendments to zones
already on the ground are likely to be drafted to permit new uses and
densities. A potential issue with floating zones is that they are regarded as
analogous to special exceptions, which the SGSDA requires, without
exception, to be consistent with the comprehensive plan. If that analogy
were to be taken seriously, a floating zone that is inconsistent with the plan
60. S.B. 280, 1999 Leg. (Md. 2009) “WHEREAS, It is the intent of the General
Assembly to encourage the development of ordinances and regulations that apply
to locally designated priority funding areas and allow for mixed uses and bonus
densities beyond those specified in the local comprehensive plan by excluding
land uses and densities or intensities in the definition of “consistency” for priority
funding areas” Id.

2017

Consistency with Comprehensive Plans

135

should not be approved.
Even if an individual rezoning application is consistent with the plan, and
meets all the necessary requirements for approval, the applicant bears high
transaction costs to satisfy the quasi-judicial procedural requirements for a
local map amendment. These include the talent and time required to secure
approval, risks of denial, and regardless of the decision, appeal. Any change
in zoning in or near residential neighborhoods poses organized community
opposition, which is often a barrier to increased development in PFAs.61
Ultimately, depending upon parcel by parcel rezoning at the initiative of
landowners and developers abdicates public responsibility for orderly
redevelopment of priority funding areas. If the Change-Mistake Rule were
abandoned in favor of consistency doctrine, it would be possible to approve
a consistent local map amendment in all the above scenarios. The
exemptions of land uses and density or intensity from consistency in PFAs
is not consistent with smart growth or effective planning.
Sectional (Comprehensive) Map Amendments
Only a small proportion of land in PFAs is suitable for high-density,
transit-oriented, walkable, mixed-use communities envisioned in state smart
growth policies. Much of it contains existing buildings that remain
profitable, even if they are not the highest and best uses of the land. It may
require substantial increases in density to justify demolition and
redevelopment. In the face of opposition to large density increases from
current owners, tenants, and adjacent neighborhoods, there are strong
economic incentives for owners of land at the periphery of central areas,
and of vacant or underutilized land some distance away, to seek more
intensive uses. This perverse incentive is facilitated by the fairly lax way in
which counties have drawn their PFAs. Cheap land, willing sellers, easy
sewer access, slight community opposition, and a permissive plan are the
basic ingredients for disorganized sprawl.
Priority funding areas in the state’s five metropolitan counties encompass
from a third to more than half of all land, including wide swaths of
established low and medium density residential neighborhoods. In
developing and rural counties, PFAs tend to encompass all land with
existing or planned sewerage service; most of it unlikely to become
candidates for intensive planned development. Pressure can be intense for

61. Casey Dawkins et al., Barriers to Development Inside Maryland’s Priority
Funding Areas: Perspectives of Planners, Developers, and Advocates, NAT’L
CTR. FOR SMART GROWTH RESEARCH AND EDUC. (Jan. 30, 2012)
http://www.mdp.state.md.us/PDF/YourPart/773/20120130/PFABarriers20120130.pdf.
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scattered higher density land uses in these areas where land is less
expensive but sewer is programmed.
The exemptions to uses, density and intensity for PFAs allow a locality
to adopt sectional map amendments that allow for more, or less, than its
comprehensive plan proposes. On the other hand, if a comprehensive plan is
adopted but no implementing sectional map amendment is enacted,
individual zoning amendments, even if consistent with the plan, must meet
the requirements of the Change-Mistake Rule. Either way, the exemptions
undermine the significance of the comprehensive plan. The best way to
achieve Smart Growth objectives is to put them in regularly updated
comprehensive plans and implement them with comprehensive zoning
amendments. The exemptions for PFAs do not work any better with
comprehensive rezoning than without it.
Change v. Consistency Doctrine in Non-PFAs
Because of the exemptions, consistency doctrine can be expected to have
greater force and engender more litigation outside PFAs. The corollary of
policies to concentrate growth in high-density centers is to reduce densities
elsewhere to protect agriculture, rural communities, open space, and natural
resources. Consequently, comprehensive plans and sectional map
amendments implementing them will involve down zoning of substantial
areas of land.
The prospect of losing the potential for urban or suburban development
will inspire some landowners to try to improve their fortunes by persuading
the local legislative body to bestow a higher density zone on their
properties. Lawsuits can be expected from disappointed owners of down
zoned land, alleging regulatory takings as well as pecuniary losses.
Sympathetic treatment of such owners by retaining or increasing the density
permitted on their properties will almost surely generate citizen/taxpayer
suits like Bell and Harwood, alleging the enclaves of up zoned land violate
the consistency requirement. Assuming both categories of complainants
achieve standing, those protesting consistent down zoning ought to expect
more difficulty prevailing on the merits than those protesting inconsistent
up zoning.
Individual Map Amendments
The legal boundary for idiosyncratic zoning is more restrictive outside
PFAs where uses and density are not exempted from the consistency
requirement. As a result, consistency could replace the Change-Mistake
Rule as a basic requirement for approval of an individual map amendment.
Logic would suggest that even though an individual rezoning applicant
succeeds in producing substantial evidence of change in the character of the
neighborhood and that the proposed zone is otherwise an appropriate use
for the site, it should be denied upon a finding that the proposed zone is not
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consistent with the comprehensive plan’s specific recommendations for the
property. This is because approval would not further and would be contrary
to one or more of the elements with which the zone must be consistent. That
result would accord with decisions of courts in other states that require
consistency of zoning actions with plans.
A plan that designates a particular zone for application to a specific
parcel leaves less room for interpretation than one that merely recommends
a land use that might be satisfied by several zones to be applied case-bycase by local map amendment. Local governments are allowed considerable
discretion when a plan’s language is aspirational (should) rather than
obligatory (shall/must) in describing uses or development standards; or uses
ranges for heights and densities.62
States that require consistency vary in the degree of deference granted
local governments in interpreting their plans. California courts will reverse
a finding of consistency “. . . only if, based on the evidence before City
Council, a reasonable person could not have reached the same
conclusion.”63 Florida, however, rejects the “fairly debatable standard” for
determining whether a land use action is consistent with a comprehensive
plan and instead subjects them to “strict scrutiny.” As applied in the land
use context, strict scrutiny is not quite the same as the rule applied in cases
claiming infringement of constitutional rights. Rather, it “arises from the
necessity of strict compliance with comprehensive plan.”64 In reviewing
whether a zoning action is inconsistent with the comprehensive plan:
The test . . . is whether the zoning authority’s determination that a
proposed development conforms to each element and the objectives
of the land use plan is supported by competent and substantial
evidence. The traditional and non-deferential standard of strict
judicial scrutiny applies.
Strict scrutiny is not defined in the land use cases which use the
phrase but its meaning can be ascertained from the common
definition of the separate words. Strict implies rigid exactness,
People v. Gardiner, 33 A.D. 204, 53 N.Y.S. 451 (1893), or
precision, Black’s Law Dictionary 1275 (5th ed. 1979). A thing
62. See generally Brian W. Ohm, Let the Courts Guide You: Planning and Zoning
Consistency, AM. PLANNING ASSOC. No. 11 (Nov. 2005) (summarizing a number
of cases from Maine, California, Washington, and Florida).
63. No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 196 Cal. App. 3d 223, 234 (1987) (internal
citations omitted).
64. Board of County Commissioners of Brevard County v. Snyder, 627 So.2d 469
(1993).
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scrutinized has been subjected to minute investigation.
Commonwealth v. White, 271 Pa. 584, 115 A. 870 (1922). Strict
scrutiny is thus the process whereby a court makes a detailed
examination of a statute, rule or order of a tribunal for exact
compliance with, or adherence to, a standard or norm. It is the
antithesis of a deferential review.65
Under this standard of review, one proposing a change in zoning has the
burden of proving it is consistent with the plan. The burden then shifts to
the government to demonstrate retaining the existing classification serves a
legitimate public purpose and of showing that the refusal to rezone the
property is not arbitrary, discriminatory, or unreasonable.66 It is not clear
that the Florida Supreme Court would be satisfied with a finding that was
only fairly debatable. It appears to have softened the view of the lower court
that the government must prove “. . .by clear and convincing evidence that a
specifically stated public necessity requires a specified, more restrictive,
use.”67 However, it concluded that:
While they may be useful, the board will not be required to make
findings of fact. However, in order to sustain the board’s action,
upon review by certiorari in the circuit court it must be shown that
there was competent substantial evidence presented to the board to
support its ruling.68
The full impact of strict scrutiny review was demonstrated in Pinecrest
Lakes, Inc. v. Shidel.69 An adjoining property owner challenged approval of
a site plan as inconsistent with the county comprehensive plan. After the
intervening developer prevailed at trial, based on a “fairly debatable”
standard of review for the county’s decision, it proceeded to develop while
the case was pending on appeal. The appellate court ordered trial de novo
on the consistency issue and the trial court found the county’s development
order was not consistent with the comprehensive plan. The court then
approved the remedy requested by the citizens: demolition of the buildings
that had been constructed. On appeal, the 4th District Court of Appeal
upheld the lower court’s finding of inconsistency and the judgment. It
rejected the idea that the local government was entitled to a high degree of
deference in interpreting its plan when the consistency of its actions with

65. Machado v. Musgrove, 519 So. 2d 629, 632 (1987).
66. Snyder, 627 So.2d at 476.
67. Id. at 471 (citing Snyder v. Board of County Com’rs of Brevard County, 595
So.2d 65 (1991)) (internal citations omitted).
68. Id. at 476.
69. Pinecrest Lakes, Inc. v. Shidel, 795 So.2d 191 (2001).
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the plan were at issue. Under Florida’s Growth Management Act of 1985,70
the court said:
“Deference by the courts . . . would not only be inconsistent with the text
and structure of the statute, but it would ignore the very reasons for
adopting the legislation in the first place.”71 In 2014 the Florida Legislature
repealed the 1984 Growth Management Act. Among provisions of the
Community Development Act that replaced it was reinstatement of the
“fairly debatable” standard for review of third party challenges to changes
in classification of individual parcels.
In the leading state case on consistency, Fasano v. Board of
Commissioners of Washington County,72 the Oregon Supreme Court held
that:
[I]t is clear that under our statutes the plan adopted by the planning
commission and the zoning ordinances enacted by the county
governing body are closely related; both are intended to be parts of
a single integrated procedure for land use control. The plan
embodies policy determinations and guiding principles; the zoning
ordinances provide the detailed means of giving effect to those
principles.” ***
We believe that the state legislature has conditioned the county’s
power to zone upon the prerequisite that the zoning attempt to
further the general welfare of the community through
consciousness, in a prospective sense, of the factors mentioned
above. In other words, except as noted later in this opinion, it must
be proved that the change is in conformance with the
comprehensive plan.73
Each of these cases dealt with individual zoning map amendments or
subdivision/site plan actions. Each of the state courts framed them as quasijudicial actions and applied a more rigorous standard of review than the test
generally applied to legislative actions. Requiring consistency with the
70.
71.
72.
73.

Growth Management Act of 1985, FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3161-163.3215 (1995).
795 So.2d at 202.
Fasano v. Board of Commissioners of Washington County, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
Id. at 27-28. The exceptions noted later involved procedural matters rather than
exceptions to the consistency test. The court added: “In proving that the change is
in conformance with the comprehensive plan in this case, the proof, at a
minimum, should show (1) there is a public need for a change of the kind in
question, and (2) that need will be best served by changing the classification of
the particular piece of property in question as compared with other available
property.” Id. at 28.
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comprehensive plan may add an additional hurdle to rezoning that clears the
Change-Mistake Rule, and could effectively displace it. A consistency rule
also could affect the use of floating zones, depending on the flexibility or
ambiguity of the plan’s land use and zoning directives.
The situation and cases above dealt with local map amendments that
involved neighborhood change but a proposed zone that was found to be
inconsistent with the comprehensive plan. Under SGSDA, however, a
finding that a proposal “furthers and is not contrary” to the elements of the
comprehensive plan should logically trump the “no change” finding. This is
because the governmental “action” of denial would not further and would
be contrary to the plan.74 As the consistency rule takes hold and all
Maryland jurisdictions adopt and maintain comprehensive plans, the
Change-Mistake Rule may have outlived its usefulness as a barrier to
piecemeal zoning in non-priority funding areas.
Sectional Map Amendments
The most interesting cases involving the consistency doctrine outside
PFAs are likely to arise in rural areas where most of the zoning in the
sectional map amendment is consistent with the comprehensive plans but a
few parcels are placed in zones that appear contrary to the plan’s
recommendations. Although defeated by lack of standing, the complaints of
Bell and Harwood, together with a circuit court case, Bilek v. the County
Commissioners of Queen Anne’s County,75 illustrate some of the issues
litigants and courts will confront.
In November 2011 the Queen Anne’s County Board of Commissioners
(BOC) enacted a comprehensive rezoning ordinance (sectional map
amendment) covering eleven parcels. Four environmental groups and 14
residents filed suit claiming that the rezoning of four of the properties was
not consistent with the county’s comprehensive plan. All four properties
were in an area designated by the county’s comprehensive plan for “Rural
Agricultural” use or “Permanently Preserved Land.” A 216-acre property
was rezoned from Agricultural (AG) to Light Industrial Highway Services
(LIHS). An 80-acre parcel was rezoned from Countryside (CS) to
Neighborhood Village Center. Thirty-one acres of a third, 173+-acre parcel,
74. Overturning denial of a consistent individual map amendment, however, would
not automatically impose the requested zone. Although an individual map
amendment involves quasi-judicial fact finding, its completion requires a
legislative act. A legislative body has discretion to approve or deny it. Courts
cannot not compel a county to approve a zoning amendment; even one consistent
with its plan. Mandamus will not lie to compel a discretionary or legislative act.
Talbot County. v. Miles Point Property, LLC, 415 Md. 372, 377 (2010).
75. Circuit Ct. for Queen Anne’s County, Case No. 17-C-11-16677, (August 7, 2012)
(hereinafter “Bilek”).
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was rezoned from Agricultural (AG) to Suburban Commercial (SC) and the
remaining 142 acres were rezoned Suburban Estate (SE). Finally, a 55-acre
property was rezoned from Agricultural (AG) to Suburban Commercial
(SC). The county’s planning commission recommended against rezoning all
four properties as contrary to the comprehensive plan. The BOC,
nonetheless, found each was consistent with it.
With no facts in dispute, plaintiffs sought summary judgment on grounds
the BOC exceeded its authority by rezoning the properties in a way that was
inconsistent with the comprehensive plan. The BOC moved to dismiss or
for summary judgment, arguing it had wide discretion in the legislative act
of rezoning.
Standing was not at issue. The circuit court first considered whether the
commissioners acted within their legal boundaries. Second it addressed
whether the zoning actions met the requirements of state and county law for
consistency with the comprehensive plan.
In rezoning the 216-acre parcel the court found the BOC clearly had not
acted within its legal boundaries because application of the LIHS Zone was
restricted to key intersections along the U.S. 301 corridor and the fact that
“the property simply does not lie within the area specified by the statute for
this particular zoning classification.”76 Summary judgment was granted for
plaintiffs with respect to that parcel without addressing the consistency
question.
The other three zoning actions required the court to consider the
consistency issue. It found the 2009 amendments to Article 66B required
the county’s zoning and development regulations to further, and not be
contrary to” seven specified items in its comprehensive plan.77 A relevant
provision of the Queen Anne’s County Zoning Code reinforced that
requirement, stating its purpose was to implement the comprehensive plan
. . . by “Giving effect to policies and proposals of the Comprehensive
Plan. . . ,”78
The court pointed out that for individual zoning map amendments, the
county code required the BOC to make a determination “based on specific
facts contained in the record” that “substantial change has occurred in the
76. Id. at 8 n.3. The court elaborated: “It is inarguable that the County
Commissioners have the legisltive authority to correct this legal mistake by
amending the County Zoning Ordinance. However, at this point the LIHS District
is limited to the Route 301 corridor and the Court cannot somehow infer that this
parcel of land at a U.S. Route 50 intersectiobn somehow lies within the Route
301 corridor, or on the record before it, can provide safe acess/egress to sites
along same.” Id.
77. MD. CODE ANN., srt. 66B §§1.02(c), 4.03, and 4.09.
78. QUEEN ANNE’S COUNTY, MD., CODE, §18:1-4 (2005).
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character of the neighborhood where the property is located” or a “mistake
was made in the existing zoning classification.”79 Comprehensive rezoning
did not require making such findings, “provided that the map amendments
are consistent with the goals and purposes of the Comprehensive Plan then
in effect.”80
The BOC contended its actions were part of a comprehensive
rezoning and, thus, it was not required to find change had occurred
or to make quasi-judicial findings of fact on the merits of the
rezoning.81
The court accepted the commissioners’ representation of their action as
comprehensive to narrow the focus of the case, but it was clearly skeptical,
noting: “the rezoning in this case has the appearance of spot zoning, rather
than part of a ‘comprehensive rezoning’ process.”82 But even assuming it
was part of a comprehensive rezoning, the court said that: “For a rezoning
ordinance, to pass muster, . . . it must be consistent with the Comprehensive
Plan which means that the ordinance will ‘further, and not be contrary to’
the seven criteria enumerated in § 1.02(c) and it must meet the consistency
requirements of § 4.03(a).”83 The court concluded that the BOC had not: “
. . . adequately demonstrated or set forth facts in their Findings and
Decision to show that they addressed the constituency requirements of
Article 66B § 1.02(c) and § 4.03(a) regarding the 2010 Comprehensive Plan
or that they designed the Ordinance to address the purposes of § 4.03(b)(1)(7).”84 Absent a record showing such consideration, there were disputed
issues of material fact, so the court denied summary judgment for either
party as to the three properties.
The BOC abandoned the case before going to trial, deciding: “that
expending further legal effort and dollars to try to uphold earlier rezoning
on four farm properties from agricultural to commercial/residential was ‘not
warranted.’”85 It is a fair inference that they concluded they could not
demonstrate the rezonings were consistent with the plan, and probably
could not convince a court that they were little more than an attempt to
bundle local map amendments and pass them off as part of comprehensive
79.
80.
81.
82.

QUEEN ANNE’S COUNTY, MD., CODE, § 18:1-222(B).
QUEEN ANNE’S COUNTY, MD., CODE, § 18:1-222(F) (2005).
Hyson, 242 Md. 55.
Bilek, at *11 (citing Anderson House v. Rockville, 402 Md. 689, 707-708 n.17
(2008)).
83. Id. at *12.
84. Id. at *13.
85. 2 THE QUEEN ANNE’S CHRONICLE 6, 4 (Nov./Dec. 2012) (citing board minutes
for August 28).
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rezoning.
Since standing was not at issue in Bilek it is not possible to know if the
plaintiffs could have sustained their suit as taxpayers. They do not seem to
have alleged any special pecuniary loss or that their taxes would have
increased as a consequence of the contested rezonings. Allegation that the
BOC’s action exceeded its legal boundaries by rezoning certain parcels
inconsistently with the comprehensive plan was accepted as a cause of
action. This was in line with Court of Appeals dicta in Harwood musing
that the requirement of alleging illegal or ulta vires governmental action
was satisfied by the allegations of impermissible spot zoning of certain
parcels, constituting arbitrary and capricious action in violation of the
consistency requirement of the state land use code.86
Discussion by the Court of Special Appeals in Bell and Harwood, and
the circuit court in Bilek, suggest the kind of reasoning needed to overcome
the strong presumption of validity for comprehensive zoning. In each case,
plaintiffs sought invalidation of the zoning of specific parcels rather than
the entire ordinance. They alleged not only that the specific parcels were
classified in zones that were inconsistent with the comprehensive plan but
also were impermissible spot zoning. These are separate arguments that
may not always overlap. Both seek to pierce the veil of comprehensive
zoning to apply a less deferential test of the validity of the zoning applied to
certain parcels than to the legislation as a whole. But the tests to be applied
are different. An inconsistent zone may not be spot zoning (at least in a
PFA), but spot zoning is almost certain to be inconsistent.
Consistency is the slipperier concept. The land use recommendations of a
comprehensive plan may range from a general use that embraces several
Euclidean and floating zones—e.g., “rural” or “medium-density
residential”—or specify a specific use or density that can be permitted only
by a particular zone. In Montgomery County, for example, the Functional
Master Plan for Agriculture and Rural Open Space contains specific zoning
recommendations. Otherwise, the Montgomery County Zoning Code’s one
agricultural zone and four rural residential zones, as well as three residential
estate zones arguably could be consistent with “rural” land uses.87 At least
six zones conceivably could satisfy a “moderate density residential”
recommendation in a plan. The more specific the plan, the less wiggle room
86. Harwood, 442 Md. at 614.
87. A general “rural” land use might be satisfied by the Agricultural Reserve (AR)
Zone with a density of one dwelling per 25 acres; the Rural (R), Rural Cluster
(RC), or Rural Neighborhood Cluster (RNC) zones—each densities of one
dwelling per five acres; and three Residential Estate zones with densities of one
to two acres. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE, Ch. 59 §§ 4.2.1, 4.3.3-4.3.5,
4.4.4-4.4.6 (2014).
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is available for the local legislature in choosing which zones to apply.
Showing the zoning is inconsistent with the comprehensive plan is only
the first step in a successful challenge for the would-be taxpayer plaintiff.
The relief sought must remedy the alleged pecuniary loss or tax increase. A
declaratory judgment that the contested zone is inconsistent or an injunction
against applying it restores the status quo ante. To the extent the plaintiff’s
injury arose from the zoning on those parcels alone it may, thus, be
remedied. This “solution,” however, tends to overlook that, most likely, the
real reason for the suit is not to save money for a class of taxpayers or to
rescue the public treasury from loss, but to require the legislative body to
follow its own plans. The original zoning on the contested parcels may also
be inconsistent with the comprehensive plan. Declaratory or injunctive
relief merely clears away the immediate wrong, but cannot fully right it.
What ultimately matters is what is built, and where.
All three cases targeted specific parcels instead of challenging the
legality of whole sectional map amendments because the standard of review
for spot zoning is far less deferential than for comprehensive zoning. The
heavy burden of overcoming the presumption of validity for comprehensive
zoning makes it desirable for a landowner to seek financially advantageous
rezoning of its property in the sectional map amendment, particularly if it
could not survive the fact-finding scrutiny of the quasi-judicial process
required for an individual map amendment.
It does not follow, however, that all parts of a sectional map amendment
are invulnerable to attack under spot zoning standards of review. In George
F. Becker Co. v. Jerns88 the Court of Appeals found reclassification of a
parcel from a residential to an industrial zone as part of a comprehensive
rezoning was nonetheless “an arbitrary and unreasonable devotion of a
small area to a use inconsistent with the uses to which the rest of the district
is restricted, made for the sole benefit of the private interests of the owner
and not in accordance with a comprehensive plan.”89
In an individual rezoning action the Howard County Board of
Commissioners granted Becker industrial zoning over the recommendation
of the planning commission, but implementation was suspended pending a
suit challenging the decision. Meanwhile, the board enacted a sectional map
amendment and again overruled the planning commission’s
recommendation to retain residential zoning on the property. No reasons in
the record were offered for this action beyond those stated two years earlier
in the local map amendment case. The Court severed the parcels from the
rest of the amendment and found the rezoning of the Becker property
irreconcilable with the comprehensive plan and applied the tests for spot
88. George F. Becker Co. v. Jerns, 230 Md. 541 (1963).
89. Id. at 546 (quoting Hewitt v. Baltimore County, 220 Md. 48 (1959)).
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zoning: There was no showing of a mistake in the original zoning or
substantial change in the character of the neighborhood. The Court
concluded:
It is not the function of the courts to zone or rezone but only to
determine whether the legislative body has properly applied the law
to the facts. Nevertheless, when there is no basis for reasonable
debate or there are no supporting facts in the record, it is proper for
the court to declare a reclassification or rezoning to be arbitrary,
whimsical, discriminatory or illegal (citations omitted).
When the record, as is the case here, is devoid of any supporting
evidence (other than the conclusions of the board which were
without probative value), there is no question to debate. There was
no showing here of a basic mistake in the original zoning or a
substantial change in the character of the neighborhood.90
This reasoning suggests that in enacting a sectional map amendment that
includes some parcels with zoning classifications that are inconsistent with
the comprehensive plan exceeds legal boundaries makes those zones
severable from the amendment and void ab initio. The Court’s application
of the Change-Mistake Rule seems unnecessary since even if there had been
a change or mistake, the industrial zoning was both inconsistent with the
plan and inappropriate for the site. Once inconsistency has been established
nothing is gained in subjecting the action to the substantive and procedural
requirements for spot zoning. The Change-Mistake analysis in Becker and
of the circuit court in Bilek, as well as dicta of the Court of Special Appeals
in Harwood, seem to be a conditioned judicial reflex in zoning cases.91
The industrial zoning in Becker clearly was inconsistent with the
residential land use recommended by the plan. A less clear-cut case would
require further analysis. If, for example, the plan recommended residential
zoning but did not specify a recommended density for each parcel and the
sectional map amendment applied a substantially denser residential zone to
Becker’s land than to any other property. An allegation of illegal spot
90. Jerns, 230 Md. at 547.
91. The Court of Special Appeals held that since plaintiffs challenged rezoning of a
specific parcel as spot zoning, the limited legal boundaries review of the entire
ordinance “did not preclude their more specific challenge.” Determining if illegal
spot zoning occurred required a site-specific analysis. “Faced with allegations of
spot zoning, a court reviews the challenged action for arbitrary, unreasonable, and
discriminatory action.” Harwood, 442 Md. at 609. Therefore, the circuit court
should have reviewed plaintiff’s challenge under this standard.
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zoning should require more than an assertion the application of the
challenged zone was an ultra vires act and beyond the legal boundary for
comprehensive zoning. At a minimum, there should be evidence the plan
had not contemplated the aberrant zone. And its defenders should be
required to provide at least a scintilla of support for the proposition that the
zone was a fairly debatable component of the plan’s residential strategy.
A possible consequence of the consistency doctrine may be to move the
struggle over land use from the mildly legalistic arena of zoning into the
more overtly political arena of plan making. An owner with ambition for
more favorable zoning of its land without enduring the individual rezoning
process will find it prudent to focus on ensuring the land uses and zoning
categories desired are raised as fairly debatable elements of the
comprehensive plan before being applied by sectional map amendment.
Once a plan has been adopted, it will be harder to challenge successfully
zoning oddities in court if they are arguably consistent with the plan.
Community and environmental activists can be expected to demand strong
and precise constraints. These competing interests could provoke a shift in
legal strategy to attack plans directly since they have attained regulatory
status, notwithstanding the wish of the General Assembly that they should
evade it.
When Zoning Inconsistency Meets Subdivision Consistency
Although the Maryland Court of Appeals has not yet spoken on the
extent of sectional map amendment consistency with master plans under the
SGSDA, there is a substantial line of judicial decisions on the consistency
of subdivisions with plans when local regulations require it. Some zones
require consistency with plans but most do not. All zones establish the
maximum density or intensity of permitted development. Within that
envelope, subdivision is concerned with the layout of a development and its
relationship to other property in the area. Local subdivision regulations
generally require consistency with master plans. Thus, if a master plan
contains language that limits density or other dimensions of future
development, the plan has regulatory precedence over the zone’s maxima.92
The SGSDA provides no exemption in PFAs for the pattern of
development. Maryland preemption doctrine would appear to allow local
jurisdictions to continue to require consistency of subdivisions with plans.93
92. Board of Commissioners of Cecil County v. Gaster, 285 Md. 233 (1979); Coffey
v. Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission, 293 Md. 24
(1982); Boyds Civic Association v. Montgomery County Council, 309 Md. 683
(1987); Maryland.-National.Capital Park and Planning Commission v. Greater
Baden-Aquasco Citizens Association. 412 Md. 73 (2009); PNS Development,
LLC v. People’s Counsel, 425 Md. 436 (2011).
93. State law may preempt local law by conflict, express preemption, or implied
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Producing a consistent subdivision on a parcel with an inconsistent zone
in a PFA has potential for metastasizing into a Catch-22. Although neither
case above involved the SGSDA’s consistency requirements (or exemptions
therefrom), two recent Court of Appeals decisions suggest the utility of
careful drafting of plan language to avoid judicial deconstruction to divine
what in the world the local land use authorities were thinking and if a
consistent subdivision should prevail in an inconsistent zone.
In Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission. v.
Greater Baden-Aquasco Citizens Association.94 the Prince George’s County
Planning Board approved a subdivision in the county’s Rural Tier, finding
it was “not inconsistent” with the county’s comprehensive plan for that
area. In making its findings, the planning board did not address the
subdivision’s relationship to the plan’s numeric growth standard for the
area, which set a goal of capturing less than one percent of the county’s
dwelling unit growth in the Rural Tier from the time of the general plan’s
adoption in 2002 to 2025. The Court held that the plan imposed a binding
obligation on the planning board to at least consider the numeric growth
objective in determining whether to approve the subdivision:
The Planning Board, in determining whether a preliminary
subdivision plan conforms to the Master Plan, either must offer
some analysis of how the preliminary subdivision plan under
consideration may impact the long-term growth objective
established in the General Plan or explain why such an analysis or
conclusion is not required, as provided in § 24-121(a)(5) of the
County Code. What the Board cannot do, however, is ignore
entirely a patently relevant element of the Plan.95
The Court emphasized the importance of addressing all of a plan’s
relevant provisions in deciding whether to approve a subdivision.
Pringle v. Montgomery County Planning Board96 took the consistency
test a step further, focusing on the way a planning standard is phrased to
preemption. Altadis U.S.A. v. Prince George’s County 431 Md. 307 (2013). Since
the SGSDA explicitly promotes consistency, it would not appear to conflict with
local consistency requirements for subdivisions. It does not explicitly preempt
such regulations. Given the overall deference of land use law and regulation in
Maryland to its local governments, claiming implied preemption in a field the
state clearly does not completely occupy seems a hard case to make.
94. Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Comm’n, 412 Md. 73.
95. Id. at 107.
96. Pringle v. Montgomery County Planning Bd. M-NCPPC, 212 Md. App. 478
(2013).
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determine the range of discretion allowed in interpreting the plan and its
application to a specific subdivision. Pringle appealed approval of a
subdivision in the Germantown employment corridor, alleging it violated
design guidelines of the 2009 sector plan97 for the area, which stated:
“Street level retail must conform to the plan’s urban design guidance.”98 In
addressing the specific area at issue, the plan directed that: “Big box
retailers, if proposed, should have active storefronts with multiple entrances
and small retail uses facing Seneca Meadows Parkway and Observation
Drive.”99 The detailed design guidelines for street-oriented development
provided:
Locate buildings adjacent to the street to form a building line of the
sidewalk and street that form public spaces. Provide front entrances
along the street to improve pedestrian convenience, Activate the
street, and reduce walking distances. Provide street level retail uses
along streets where street activity is desired. Place retail,
restaurants, and other uses at highly visible locations along
boulevards and main streets to add vitality and convenience. Design
retail storefronts with large, clear glass windows for merchandise
display that promote retailing and add visual interest to the street.100
Although the plan’s admonition that development “must conform” to its
recommendations was binding and the layout of the subdivision’s big box
supermarket and other retail departed from them, the Court of Special
Appeals found the planning board had based its decision on substantial
evidence that some of the guidelines were not feasible on the site.
Moreover, the term should provided sufficient latitude to deviate from
them. The court concluded: “[W]e are persuaded that there is substantial
evidence in the record to support the Planning Board’s findings of fact
regarding the characteristics of the site itself and its ultimate conclusion of
consistency with the Sector Plan.”101 The planning board had met its burden
of justifying its decision that the subdivision was consistent with the plan.
While neither of these cases rested on the new consistency standard of
the SGSDA they suggest that courts take seriously consistency
requirements. Both cases underline the need for local legislatures and
regulatory agencies to consider and document their consideration of

97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 480.
Id. at 481.
Id.
Id. at n.3. (noting the design guidelines in regard to “Street-Oriented
Development”).
101. Id. at 491.
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standards and guidelines enunciated in plans and that they cannot expect
courts to accept “findings” that are not based on substantial evidence.
Moreover, in both cases the burden of proving their action was consistent
with plans shifted to the defendant planning boards. Assertions of
consistency unsupported by a record of evidence-based reasons are unlikely
to amuse a court. As Judge Harrell wrote in Acquasco-Baden:
The Board’s conclusion that the application was ‘not inconsistent’
with the 2002 General Plan Development Pattern policies for the
Rural Tier was a broad conclusory statement and not based on
sufficient facts in the record before it. Such a half-baked conclusion
is not entitled to deferential review.102
A lesson to be drawn from these cases is that in crafting the language of
plans, careful forethought should be given to how tightly to bind regulatory
agencies charged with administering them. Foolish consistency can become
a hobgoblin of future regulators, developers, and citizens. What must be
done shall be done. What should be done, can be done a bit differently.
If the reasoning of the subdivision cases is applied to a claim of violation
of the consistency standard of the SGSDA by treatment of a particular
parcel included in a sectional map amendment, there would be a rebuttable
proposition that a local zoning authority exceeded its legal boundaries upon
a showing that the zoning on a specific parcel included in the SMA was
inconsistent with the comprehensive plan. The burden would then shift to
the government to demonstrate that it considered the matter and reached its
decision that the action was consistent with the plan based on substantial
evidence of record. Such a finding should require more than a conclusory
assertion by the local legislative body. It should not, however, require proof
of change in neighborhood character or mistake in the original zoning; only
that reasonable minds could disagree whether the zone applied was
consistent with the plan.
Summing Up: It Doesn’t Quite Add Up
The most remarkable feature of Maryland’s new consistency doctrine is
its inconsistency in the treatment of priority funding areas and land outside
them. The exemptions for land uses and density/intensities in PFAs
essentially leave comprehensive plans where they were before the purported
legislative overruling of Terrapin Run. This undermines the authority of
plans with respect to zoning but in jurisdictions that require consistency of

102. Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Comm’n, 412 Md. at 109.
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subdivisions with plans, there is potential for tension in aligning consistent
subdivisions with inconsistent zones.
In areas outside PFAs, consistency doctrine seems at odds with the hoary
Change-Mistake Rule. It logically would permit approval of an individual
zoning map amendment that was consistent with the plan, even though
there was no change in the neighborhood and deny an inconsistent
application notwithstanding a clear showing of change or mistake. In PFAs,
the Change-Mistake Rule will remain relevant in situations where a
comprehensive plan is not implemented by a consistent sectional map
amendment. If a sectional map amendment establishes a new baseline for
measuring neighborhood change the rule is of no consequence since
showing change would be virtually impossible. Removal of the exemptions
and abandonment of the Change-Mistake Rule would better serve the cause
of smart growth and effective planning.
If the General Assembly’s approach to consistency is a bit inconsistent,
enforcement of it through judicial review of sectional map amendments
may require nimble allegations and liberal suspension of judicial disbelief
for complainants to achieve taxpayer standing to serve as private attorneys
general. If rigorously applied, it makes sectional map amendments, if not
fully impregnable, at least hard to attack by both disappointed landowners
and civic watchdogs. On the other hand, statutory rights of appeal and
grants of jurisdiction for review of sectional map amendments may make
taxpayer standing more a jurisprudential curiosity than a regulator of
litigation.
Finally, while consistency doctrine strengthens the role of plans in the
management of growth and regulation of land uses, it contains an inherent
moral and policy hazard. Elevation of plans to regulatory status produces a
perverse incentive, even with the best of intentions, to over specify
requirements for each parcel of land and to bind the future too tightly to the
preferences of the moment of the plan’s adoption. Tastes in styles of living
and working and the design and technology of development often changes
more quickly than revision of plans. Balancing the need for direction in the
public interest with the ability of the private producers of homes and
business spaces to adapt to shifts in markets and tastes without first
amending comprehensive plans will require attention to both the art and
economics of planning. Consistency does not require exactitude.

